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FREEDOM AT HOME REVISITED: THE NEW MEXICO
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AFTER NEW MEXICO
RIGHT TO CHOOSE/NARAL V. JOHNSON
LINDA M. VANZI*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, when state constitutional issues were of seemingly greater scholarly
interest, I wrote a law review article about the use of the New Mexico Constitution
in challenging an abortion funding regulation.1 I have been asked to revisit that
article and to update what has taken place in the area of state constitutional law,
particularly with regard to women’s rights. This article addresses the broad ques-
tion of the extent to which the Equal Rights Amendment has been asserted to
provide explicit protection against sex discrimination under the New Mexico
Constitution.
During the two decades prior to my first article, the U.S. Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that under federal law a state may fund childbirth related expenses
without funding medically necessary abortions.2 The same Court had decided that
the Hyde Amendment’s federal ban on Medicaid-funded abortion was constitu-
tional.3 Inherent in these holdings was the determination that subsistence pay-
ments did not restrict the exercise of any constitutionally protected fundamental
rights. Consequently, litigants started turning to their state constitutions in the
hopes that their state courts would diverge from federal precedent to find a greater
degree of privacy and equality protection than under the U.S. Constitution. Not
unexpectedly, the results were mixed and the analyses varied.4
New Mexico was among the states that responded to the challenge, and on
April 21, 1995, a team of lawyers filed suit against the Department of Health and
Human Services (HSD) seeking to enjoin a proposed regulation that would limit
financial assistance for abortions to indigent women.5 The district court, in New
* Linda M. Vanzi is currently a judge on the New Mexico Court of Appeals. She would like to thank
Maureen A. Sanders and Jennifer Gardner for their invaluable suggestions and insights on several prior drafts.
1. Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home: State Constitutions and Medicaid Funding for Abortions, 26
N.M. L. REV. 433 (1996).
2. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–80 (1977); Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977).
3. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980).
4. Compare Doe v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992), and Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985) (both upholding limitations on abortion funding under the equal protection
clauses of their state constitutions), with Comm. to Defend Repro. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981),
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986), Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass.
1981), Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982), N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Danfelser, No.
SF 95-867(C) (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995), Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Dep’t of Human Res., 663 P.2d 1247
(Or. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d en banc on statutory grounds, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984), and Women’s Health Ctr. Of
W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1993) (all striking down statutes restricting abortion funding
relying upon both state constitutional provisions with federal analogs and other provisions such as state Equal
Rights Amendments which had no federal counterpart). For other cases showing mixed results and varied
analyses see Vanzi, supra note 1, at 441 & nn.62–65, 442 n.67 (discussing Women of Minn. v. Steffen, No. MC
93-3995 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 16, 1994); Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84CnC (Vt. Super. Ct. May 26, 1986); Roe v.
Harris, No. 96977 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1994); Doe v. Wright, No.91-CH-1958 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994),
leave to file late appeal denied, No. 78512 (Ill. Feb. 28, 1995); Doe v. Masten Childers, No. 94CI02183 (Ky. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 7, 1995)).
5. Pregnancy Termination Procedures, New Mexico Human Services Department, II N.M. Reg., p.
684 (4/29/95, codified at 8.325.7 NMAC, as amended through 11/1/03). The regulation mirrored the limitations
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Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Danfelser, agreed with the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments that the proposed regulation violated the state constitutional guarantees of
due process, inherent rights, equal protection, and equal rights.6 Six days later, the
court ordered a permanent injunction prohibiting the implementation of the pro-
posed regulation.7 My article was written after the district court ruling but the case
continued to wind its way through the appeals process for three more years. On
the day before Thanksgiving in 1998, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued its
opinion affirming the district court.8
It has been twelve years since Justice Minzner authored the groundbreaking
decision in New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson (NARAL).9 The
court’s ruling, which utilized the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as
the basis for its decision, was noteworthy because it unequivocally transported
New Mexico’s constitutional equality jurisprudence into a new dimension. This ar-
ticle analyzes the supreme court’s decision and then addresses the effectiveness of
the ERA in other discrimination claims where men and women are similarly situ-
ated. Specifically, this article looks at the application of the substantive analysis in
the only case to use the New Mexico ERA since the NARAL decision.
I. A SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY—
THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT’S OPINION IN NEW
MEXICO RIGHT TO CHOOSE/NARAL V. JOHNSON
On appeal in the New Mexico Supreme Court, the NARAL plaintiffs raised all
of the same constitutional arguments that they had argued in the district court
below.10 They particularly relied on the fact that our courts have long held that the
state constitution is not limited by the U.S. Constitution and that the state constitu-
tion often provides its citizens broader protections than its federal counterpart.11
However, most of the cases finding these more expansive rights under the New
Mexico Constitution had dealt primarily with the First and Fourth Amendments.12
In NARAL, I think that the lawyers believed the New Mexico Supreme Court
would broaden those protections yet again, and that the court would engage in
under the Federal Medical program and prohibited the use of state funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid-
eligible women except when necessary to save the life of the mother, to end an ectopic pregnancy, or when the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. See id.
6. See N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C) (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995).
7. Id.
8. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, 975 P.2d 841 (filed 1998).
9. Id.
10. See id. ¶ 8, 975 P.2d at 846.
11. See id. ¶ 25, 975 P.2d at 850. For cases discussing how the New Mexico Constitution often provides
its citizens broader protections than its federal counterpart, see State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 435–36, 863
P.2d 1052, 1056–57 (1993) (noting that New Mexico courts “independently analyze the New Mexico constitu-
tional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures”); Blea v. City of Espanola, 117 N.M. 217, 221,
870 P.2d 755, 759 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that the state supreme court has “continued its expansion of
rights in favor of the citizen”); City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 114 N.M. 537, 544–45, 843 P.2d 839, 846–47 (Ct.
App. 1992) (“[F]ederal decisions do not control the nature and scope of the rights guaranteed by the New
Mexico Constitution.”).
12. See, e.g., State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 147–51, 870 P.2d 103, 109–13 (1994); State v. Gutierrez,
116 N.M. 431, 435–36, 863 P.2d 1052, 1056–57 (1993); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 212 n.1, 784 P.2d 30, 31
n.1 (1989).
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either a substantive analysis under the state constitution’s due process clause,13 or
in an equal protection analysis under its inherent rights clause.14 That did not prove
to be the case.
Instead of using the formal equality analysis of federal precedent, the supreme
court turned to the unique and independent language of the New Mexico ERA15 to
expand the scope of protection against sex inequality.16 The court made clear that
the state ERA provides more comprehensive protection against sex discrimination
and that distinctions based on pregnancy, although a physical characteristic unique
to women, must be subject to strict scrutiny review where they operate to disad-
vantage women.17 Thus, “‘[t]he question at hand is whether government has the
power to turn th[e] capacity [to bear children], limited as it is to one gender, into a
source of social disadvantage.’”18 Further elaborating upon a substantive equality
approach to gender discrimination, the court concluded that HSD’s regulation was
part of a long history in which “women’s biology and ability to bear children have
been used as a basis for discrimination against them,”19 and that the law discrimi-
nated against women by singling them out for distinctly different treatment than
men with reference to medically necessary medical services.20
The most interesting part of Justice Minzner’s opinion was her examination of
the text of the ERA as well as its history and meaning from territorial times to the
present.21 The court noted that the New Mexico ERA was passed in 1973 “by an
overwhelming margin”22 and represented “the culmination of a series of state con-
13. The New Mexico due process clause provides: “No person shall be deprived of life or property
without due process of law. . . .” N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
14. Article II, section 4 states: “All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent
and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.” N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 4. The plaintiffs had argued that “a woman’s right to reproductive choice is among the inherent rights guar-
anteed by Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution, and that the [regulation] unlawfully infringes
upon this right because it favors childbirth over abortion.” NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 3, 975 P.2d at 844.
15. New Mexico’s ERA provides: “Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the
sex of any person.” N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
16. NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 30, 36, 975 P.2d at 851–52, 853.
17. Id. ¶¶ 34–43, 975 P.2d at 853–55. The “strict scrutiny” standard used by the New Mexico Supreme
Court is in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that sex discrimination claims would be reviewed under
an “intermediate scrutiny” standard. The “intermediate scrutiny” standard only requires proof that classifica-
tions based on sex “serve important governmental objectives” and those objectives must be substantially ad-
vanced by the use of the sex-based classification. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
18. NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 40, 975 P.2d at 854 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitu-
tional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33
(1992)). The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected outright the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076, as recognized in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669 (1983), empha-
sizing that “it would be error to conclude that men and women are not similarly situated with respect to a
classification simply because the classifying trait is a physical characteristic unique to one sex.” NARAL, 1999-
NMSC-005, ¶¶ 38–39, 975 P.2d at 854.
19. NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 41, 975 P.2d at 854 (quoting Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 139 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1986)).
20. Id. ¶¶ 46–47, 975 P.2d at 856 (“[T]here is no comparable restriction on medically necessary services
relating to physical characteristics or conditions that are unique to men. Indeed, we can find no provi-
sion . . . that disfavors any comparable, medically necessary procedure unique to the male anatomy. . . .
Thus, [the regulation] undoubtedly singles out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked condition that is
unique to women.”).
21. Id. ¶¶ 27–37, 975 P.2d at 850–53.
22. Id. ¶ 29, 975 P.2d at 851.
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stitutional amendments that reflect an evolving concept of gender equality in this
State.”23 Justice Minzner’s historical narrative took readers on a journey from pre-
statehood debates about a woman’s right to vote and to hold public office, to her
right to practice law in the Territory.24 It traced the path from women being consid-
ered “incapable mentally of exercising judgment and discretion” and of restrictive
community property laws, to the removal of “gender-based restrictions on veter-
ans’ property tax exemptions” and “changes to the definition of criminal sexual
offenses.”25
The inevitable conclusion reached by the court was that the ERA was added to
New Mexico’s constitution with the specific intention of providing broader protec-
tion against sex discrimination than that afforded under the U.S. Constitution.26
The federal courts had long relied upon a formal equality paradigm which applied
a less rigorous standard in sex discrimination cases, thus limiting the scope of pro-
tection afforded to women.27 The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded, how-
ever, that “the federal equal-protection analysis [was] inapposite with respect to
[the] claim of gender discrimination.”28 Having disposed of federal precedent, the
court went on to scrutinize the funding restriction from a substantive equality per-
spective that focused on the multiple ways in which the regulation contributed to
women’s subordination.29
The NARAL case illustrated the New Mexico ERA’s potential for enhancing
protection against sex discrimination beyond the formal equality limits of Federal
Equal Protection Clause analysis. It appears, however, that like other states with
similar provisions, the promise that the ERA held in advancing sex equality for
women has had little application in sex equality jurisprudence in New Mexico since
1998.
II. THE FAILURE TO UTILIZE THE FULL SCOPE OF PROTECTIONS
AFFORDED BY THE ERA
Since the 1970s, when most of them were adopted, state ERAs have been used
in a variety of factual contexts to challenge laws and policies that discriminate
against women. Courts across the country have decided cases under their ERAs
dealing with reproductive autonomy,30 unwed parents,31 disparate impact,32 and
23. Id. ¶ 31, 975 P.2d at 852.
24. Id. ¶ 32, 975 P.2d at 852.
25. Id. ¶¶ 32–35, 975 P.2d at 852–53.
26. See id. The Court noted that “New Mexico’s Equal Rights Amendment is a specific prohibition that
provides a legal remedy for the invidious consequences of the gender-based discrimination that prevailed
under the common law and civil law traditions that preceded it.” Id. ¶ 36, 975 P.2d at 853.
27. See supra note 17. This less rigorous standard has often resulted in unpredictable outcomes. In fact,
many “courts, commentators, and even Supreme Court Justices, have criticized the intermediate standard as
vague, poorly defined and malleable, providing insufficient guidance in individual cases.” Linda J. Wharton,
State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex
Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1213 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
28. NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 28, 975 P.2d at 851.
29. Id. ¶¶ 48–52, 975 P.2d at 856–57.
30. See, e.g., Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Colo. 1988) (en
banc) (holding that excluding the costs of normal pregnancy care from an otherwise comprehensive insurance
coverage constitutes sex discrimination in violation of the Colorado ERA); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (invalidating Connecticut’s restrictions on funding medically necessary abortions on
the basis of Connecticut’s ERA); Allison-LeBlanc v. Dep’t. of Pub. Safety & Corr., 671 So.2d 448, 452–53 (La.
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even discrimination based on sexual orientation.33 However, commentators have
noted that realization of the full potential of state ERAs has been frustrated by the
fact that they have not been frequently used by litigators34 and, that the use of
these state ERAs appears to be diminishing.35
Needless to say, there has been much debate about why state ERAs are not
being used. The explanations for the lack of receptivity by litigators and courts to
use state ERAs are as varied as the ERAs themselves. Some state constitutional
law scholars argue that because legal education tends to focus on federal constitu-
tional law, graduating students are less comfortable and knowledgeable in the area
of state constitutional law.36 Others argue that the passage of numerous statutes
and regulations targeted at sex discrimination has provided alternative avenues for
relief in most cases, and that is where litigators tend to turn.37 Still others theorize
that obstacles to adequate remedies may discourage claims under state constitu-
tions.38 New Mexico courts, for example, have not yet allowed private actions for
damages for violations of state constitutional rights,39 nor have they awarded attor-
neys’ fees in the absence of a statute.40
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that automatic reassignment of pregnant police officer to administrative duty or leave
violates Louisiana ERA).
31. See, e.g., Estate of Hicks, 675 N.E.2d 89, 99 (Ill. 1996) (using the Illinois ERA to strike down a
provision allowing only mothers to inherit from illegitimate children who die intestate); In re McLean, 725
S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1987) (using the Texas ERA to strike down a statute that required a father, but not a
mother, to prove it was in the best interest of a child born out of wedlock that he be recognized as a parent);
Guard v. Jackson, 940 P.2d 642, 645 (Wash. 1997) (relying on the state ERA to invalidate a statute that re-
quired the father, but not the mother, of an illegitimate child to have regularly contributed to the support of a
minor child in order to recover for the child’s wrongful death).
32. See, e.g., DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 179–80 (Pa. 1975) (invalidating a common law rule
under the state ERA that made household goods acquired during a marriage presumptively the property of
the husband).
33. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (relying on the Hawaii ERA to hold that its prohibi-
tion on same-sex marriage established a sex-based classification). The Hawaii court used a formal equality
analysis and reasoned that because Hawaii’s law allowed men to marry women, but prevented women from
marrying women, it denied women (and conversely men) the ability to do something that men could do
thereby constraining women’s (and men’s) choice of marital partners because of sex. See id. at 64–67. The
court’s ruling, however, never went into effect because the Hawaii voters amended the Hawaii Constitution to
allow the state legislature “the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.” HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
34. Wharton, supra note 27, at 1275.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1276 (citing Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some Observations on the Overlap-
ping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25, 31–34 (1993)).
37. Id. at 1275.
38. Id. at 1277.
39. See, e.g., Bell v. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV 06-1137 JB/ACT, 2008 WL 2397670, at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 30,
2008) (noting that a plaintiff cannot seek damages for violations of rights under the New Mexico Constitution
absent an express waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act); Barreras v. State, 2003-NMCA-027, ¶ 24, 62
P.3d 770, 776 (same); Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMCA-004, ¶ 11, 952 P.2d 474, 477 (same). Al-
though New Mexico’s expansive interpretation of state constitutional rights and its finding of self-executing
rights could yet result in an implied cause of action for damages, to date, the New Mexico ERA has been used
primarily to obtain injunctive relief, rather than as a basis for recovering damages. See, e.g., N.M. Right to
Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 60, 975 P.2d 841, 859 (filed 1998). For additional discussion
concerning damages actions for violations of state constitutional rights, see Allison Crist, Civil Rights—No
Private Attorney General Exception to the American Rule in New Mexico: New Mexico Right to Choose/
National Abortion Rights Action League v. Johnson, 31 N.M. L. REV. 585 (2001); Jennifer Friesen, Recovering
Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1269 (1985); Paul R. Owen, Reticent Revolution:
Prospects for Damage Suits Under the New Mexico Bill of Rights, 25 N.M. L. REV. 173 (1995).
40. The experience of the NARAL plaintiffs illustrates this particular difficulty. After their victory in
obtaining abortion funding for poor women under the New Mexico ERA, the state supreme court denied
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Whatever the reason, like the lawyers in the rest of the country, in the past
decade lawyers have brought few claims under the New Mexico ERA. In the after-
math of the supreme court’s NARAL opinion, and its unequivocal expansion of
constitutional protection against sex discrimination, one would hope that lawyers
would have been greatly encouraged to challenge laws and policies that support or
promote gender oppression and heterosexisim in New Mexico. That has not been
the case and instead, consideration of the ERA has been limited to a single appel-
late decision.
III. FEMALE TOPLESSNESS AND THE ERA—CITY OF
ALBUQUERQUE V. SACHS
In 2004, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that a city ordinance prohibit-
ing only women from showing their breasts in a public place without an opaque
covering of the entire nipple does not violate the ERA of the New Mexico Consti-
tution.41 The facts in the case were simple. Renee Sachs owned and operated a
tattoo and body modification store in Albuquerque.42 She published a gender neu-
tral advertisement offering customers a free nipple piercing as long as they agreed
to have the piercing done in the front window of the business, which was visible
from the sidewalk.43 Not unexpectedly, people agreed to the free procedure. The
second customer, a female, sat in the front window with her breasts exposed while
she had her nipples pierced.44 Several people, including a police officer who had
just arrived, watched from the sidewalk.45
Sachs was convicted of violating Section 11-8-3(B) of an Albuquerque city ordi-
nance.46 The district court denied Sachs’ motion to dismiss on the basis—among
other things—that the ordinance is unconstitutional under the ERA because it
prohibits only the showing of the female breast and not the male breast.47 The
court of appeals, after a fairly lengthy—but rather tautological—discussion about
the “physiological and sexual distinctions” between male and female breasts, con-
cluded that the classification in the ordinance is based on a unique characteristic,
and that the differences in physical characteristics made by the ordinance do not
plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees and joined a majority of states in refusing to adopt a “private attorney general”
exception that would allow fees in the absence of a statute when litigation protects important societal interests.
N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 26–28, 34, 986 P.2d 450, 458, 460.
41. City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, 2004-NMCA-065, ¶ 1, 92 P.3d 24, 25.
42. Id. ¶ 2, 92 P.3d at 26.
43. Id.
44. Id. The first customer was a male who, while he may have been a curiosity, did not attract the
attention of the police. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. ¶ 4, 92 P.3d at 26.
Section 11-8-3 of the City Ordinance at issue states in pertinent part:
(A) No person shall knowingly or intentionally, in a public place . . . appear in a state of
nudity;
(B) No person who owns or operates a public place shall knowingly or intentionally permit
or allow another person to violate the provisions of this article in that public place.
Id. ¶ 3, 92 P.3d at 26.
The ordinance defined “nudity” as: “The showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of a part of the nipple. . . .” Id.
47. Id. ¶ 5, 92 P.3d at 26.
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operate to the disadvantage of women.48 Thus, according to the New Mexico Court
of Appeals, the ordinance does not treat men and women differently in violation
of the ERA.49
In finding that the compulsory covering of the female breast does not constitute
discrimination for purposes of the ERA, the court first reasoned that the ordi-
nance’s prohibition on public nudity properly distinguished between males and fe-
males on the basis of “unique physical characteristics attributable to each.”50 It
then noted that there must be proof that the classification works to the disadvan-
tage of the person thus classified in order to establish a violation of the ERA.51
Had Renee Sachs asserted a disadvantage, the state would then have had the bur-
den to show that there was a compelling interest behind the law in question and
that such interest was accomplished by the least restrictive means.52 On appeal,
Sachs did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the ordinance did not
present a disadvantage to women.53 As a result, the appeals court did not engage in
a strict scrutiny analysis under the New Mexico ERA as required by NARAL.
Instead, the court examined the common law roots of nudity as well as the treat-
ment of similar laws in other jurisdictions.54 For example, it turned to City of Seattle
v. Buchanan, in which the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a Seattle ordi-
nance banning public exposure of female breasts as “lewd conduct.”55 The Wash-
ington court held that its ERA does not prohibit sex-based classifications that are
based on actual physical differences between the sexes and bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate legislative purpose.56 The Buchanan court further stated
that “the obvious purpose of the ordinance [is] to protect the public morals and its
concern for the privacy of intimate functions” and concluded that it was reasonably
related to that purpose.57
In reaching its decision, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Sachs appears to
have missed the central point established by the supreme court in NARAL. The
court did not utilize a substantive approach requiring that it look first to whether
the law discriminates against one sex solely on the basis of gender.58 Instead, it
48. Id. ¶ 15, 92 P.3d at 28–29.
49. Id. ¶ 16, 92 P.3d at 29.
50. Id. ¶ 13, 92 P.3d at 27.
51. Id.
52. Id. Interestingly, several of the cases cited in Sachs involved women’s right to dance topless as a
means of employment. See id. ¶ 15, 92 P.3d at 28. It is also noteworthy that the court of appeals did not
examine critically the fact that its ruling would allow men to benefit from the advertisement (i.e., they could
get free piercings) while women would be denied the same opportunity.
53. Id. ¶ 11, 92 P.3d at 27.
54. See id. ¶¶ 13–15, 92 P.3d at 27–29.
55. City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918, 920 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); see also MJR’s Fare of
Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 792 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Tex. App. 1990) (resorting to the unique “physical charac-
teristics” exception to prove that female breasts are different).
56. Buchanan, 584 P.2d at 921. The Washington court relied on the City’s undisputed testimony that
physiological and sexual distinctions exist between male and female breasts; that such differences are external
and internal; and that the female, but not male, breast is a mammary gland. See id. at 919–20.
57. Id. at 920.
58. Sachs, 2004-NMCA-065, ¶¶ 9–16, 92 P.3d at 26–29. Interestingly, although these courts essentially
claim that the difference is purely biological, only two courts have actually heard evidence on the physical
characteristics of men and women’s breasts. See Buchanan, 584 P.2d at 921; MJR’s Fare of Dallas, Inc., 792
S.W.2d at 575; see also Messina v. State, 904 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Tex. App. 1995) (taking judicial notice of the
sexual nature of women’s breasts).
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resorted to the physical characteristics exception.59 The court’s analysis thus re-
duced the matter to a simple determination that female breasts are in fact different
than male breasts, and used a biological difference to justify a social stereotype.
Notwithstanding documentary evidence that there is no inherent, significant differ-
ence between men’s and women’s breasts, it appears that the court was primarily
concerned not with whether there is a difference but rather with societal norms.
Like most other state courts, the New Mexico Court of Appeals attempted to
paint the sexual nature of men’s and women’s breasts as a real difference between
men and women.60 As one commentator has noted, however, the conclusion that
the breast is an erogenous zone and that decency dictates coverage is too simplis-
tic.61 Even if we agree that symbolically only the female breast is sexualized and
that the male breast is not, an honest substantive equality analysis under the New
Mexico ERA should require us to ask who is doing the sexualizing. The question
then becomes: Can substantive equality account for gender differences without
making the male sex its normative role? Under NARAL, I think it has to.
The principle that the New Mexico ERA should not be used to enforce negative
social stereotypes was clearly pronounced in NARAL.62 It would ignore all the
teachings of that case to merely rely on the decisions of courts from other jurisdic-
tions to decide whether the city ordinance—in light of the history of discrimination
against women in New Mexico—can withstand strict scrutiny. Even assuming that
the relevant question was limited to a focus on unique characteristics, given the
New Mexico ERA’s interest in ridding society of gender stereotypes, the appeals
court perhaps should have explained why this governmental interest had to give
way to society’s stereotypes.
CONCLUSION
For years various provisions of the New Mexico Constitution have been used to
assess the validity of our statutes and ordinances. However, it is hard to believe
that in the past decade, the only application of the ERA has been with regard to
the right of a tattoo parlor along Albuquerque’s Route 66 to challenge an ordi-
nance prohibiting it from piercing a woman’s nipples in its front window. On one
hand, given the history of women’s oppression—as chronicled in NARAL—one
must wonder whether this was the sort of perceived bias against women that the
rich protection for equality rights embedded in the New Mexico ERA was meant
to remedy. On the other hand, one could argue that the enforcement of societal
Moreover, some of that evidence shows that the physical difference between men and women is questiona-
ble at best. For example, the expert in Buchanan testified that “there is no difference in the composition of the
flesh of male and female breasts; that the breasts do not form a primary sex characteristic but a secondary one,
and that the degree of development of the breasts does not determine sex.” Buchanan, 584 P.2d at 919.
59. Buchanan, 584 P.2d at 919.
60. One could argue that these “sexual differences” between male and female breasts, cited in
Buchanan and relied upon by Sachs, produces a distinctly male heterosexual point of view which ultimately
forms the basis of disadvantage to women.
61. Virginia F. Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness: Why “Real Difference” Jurisprudence Lacks
“Support” and What Can Be Done About It, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 285 (2005) (noting that the conclusion
“arises from a limited perspective, that of heterosexual men at a distinct point in time, and yet it claims to
identify a real, ancient difference”).
62. See N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 36, 975 P.2d 841, 853 (filed
1998).
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norms, at least where it prejudices a particular group, is one of the very things
against which the ERA is meant to protect.
NARAL, and its unequivocal expansion of constitutional protection against sex
discrimination, leaves no doubt that our ERA is an important legal tool in advanc-
ing women’s equality. On the surface, however, it appears that the use of the ERA
is underutilized by New Mexico litigators who seek to remedy gender-motivated
discrimination. NARAL honored the distinctive language and history of our ERA
and we must as well. To realize the full potential of the New Mexico ERA in our
constitutional culture, we must continue to challenge laws and policies that perpet-
uate gender oppression and heterosexisim by fully utilizing this important constitu-
tional amendment.

